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What South Koreans Think

by Walter Sullivan

In the midst of Dr. Syngman Rhee's violent struggle with the National Assembly last spring it was widely said that rising popular opposition was weakening the aging president's grip on South Korea. Two months later, on August 5, Rhee was re-elected by what appeared to be a landslide.

The answer to this seeming paradox is that in breaking the National Assembly by direct police action Rhee destroyed the only organized opposition facing him in South Korea. His control emerged unchallenged over the police and over those quasi-official organizations through which he exercises his influence.

There was indignation overseas. Diplomatic action was taken by Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand and the United States. Prime Minister Winston Churchill assured the House of Commons that British troops were not in Korea to secure the establishment of a dictatorship.

Nevertheless, as on similar previous occasions, the United States continued to accept Rhee as a better alternative than the loss of South Korea to the Communists.

In the end the South Korean leader had his way, but there was an ominous loss of faith

in the government. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) repeatedly expressed its alarm to President Rhee. It told him, in one note, that it did not intend to interfere in his government's internal politics but that the United Nations, having taken up arms in defense of South Korea, had both a right and an interest to see that the country's constitution was observed. This must be done, UNCURK said, "so that there will be no doubt as to the legitimacy of the government of the country on whose behalf so many lives are being spent by other countries."

UNCURK reported to the seventh session of the UN General Assembly in New York that a conflict between executive and legislative branches of government in a new state was to be expected. "The disturbing features, in this case," it said, "were the disregard of the provisions of the constitution and law, the attempted resort to 'mob rule,' and the use of martial law and government authority to limit freedom of political expression."

The struggle between Rhee and the Assembly dates back to 1949, when the first mass arrest of opposing Assemblymen took place. It

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became more bitter after the Rhee forces in the Assembly were weakened by the 1950 elections. The opposition is not left-wing, but rather an alliance of businessmen and others who accuse the government of permitting corruption, maladministration and inflation to strangle free enterprise.

Despite the international interest which it evoked, Rhee's struggle with his opponents was waged before a surprisingly small audience of Koreans. Of the 21 million people believed to be living now in South Korea, 15 million are peasants, while 2,618,000 are refugees. The great mass of peasants live in isolated valleys beyond reach of radio or newspapers. Many of them are illiterate.

These are truly the people of Korea, and it is their sagging morale that presents the most serious long-range problem. In the words of J. Donald Kingsley, head of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), there is a "mounting spiral of despair" in the countryside. "There is grave danger," he reported to the UN General Assembly, "unless there is prompt and effective assistance in the restoration of the Korean economy and in the development of a more satisfactory life behind the lines, that the United Nations victory may be jeopardized." Regardless of the military outcome, he warned, "United Nations objectives in Korea might be lost."

In a letter to a friend in the United States an independent-minded Korean was more explicit. He found a tendency among the peasants in his home village to conclude that once

the fighting is over and the "foreigners" go home the Communists will win out in the end. It is hard to say how widespread this feeling may be.

Despair — and Hope

The roots of the despair lie not in disgust with the tactics of Rhee and his supporters in the capital, of which the peasants are hardly aware. The roots are economic. Since the Korean war began the amount of money in circulation has increased 8.5 times. Between May 1951 and August 1952 the price of 20 litres of rice at Pusan, the provisional capital, rose from 17,500 won to 150,000 won. The fact that prices have gone up even faster than the rate in increase of money is believed by UN experts to reflect a loss of public confidence in the economy.

Some correspondents reporting on the presidential election last August saw in its results evidence of disillusionment in the countryside. They pointed to the tactics of rural police and others of Rhee's supporters, and to the brief nine-day period of electioneering, which insured that Rhee would be the only candidate widely known to the electorate. Yet over 25 percent of the voters supported his rivals.

It is probable, however, that this sentiment represents not so much a slap at Rhee personally as a protest against the government in general—against maladministration and police abuses which have long characterized the Korean scene but are less burdensome in times of prosperity.

The picture is, of course, not entirely black. A \$70 million program

of reconstruction was announced by UNKRA in October. Hitherto almost all reconstruction work was done by the United Nations Command and consisted primarily in rebuilding transport facilities of military value. South Korea has been spared new war damage for over a year, but because cargo space was monopolized by military needs capital goods could not be shipped in. Now UNKRA has arranged with the UN Command to take over part of the relief and rehabilitation work. During the remainder of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953 it plans to bring in \$11.5 million worth of capital machinery and spend considerable sums on other projects to restore production.

One of the more optimistic notes in the recent UNCURK report was the statement that the bitter fight between Rhee and the Assembly did not embroil the Army. The American Presidential campaign debate also disclosed considerable sentiment on the part of UN commanders in Korea that ROK troops are reliable and can gradually be given more responsibility.

UN officials, however, believe that the problem of civilian morale cannot be solved until there is a dramatic revival of production, and hence, in their opinion, the program of reconstruction is getting under way none too soon.

(Mr. Sullivan, Berlin correspondent of *The New York Times*, reported on the Far East from 1948 to 1950, during which time he covered Korea before and during the fighting. He later served as UN correspondent before taking up his present assignment.)

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New FPA President

The election of John W. Nason as president of the Foreign Policy Association was announced on December 3 by Eustace Seligman, chairman of the Board of Directors. Dr. Nason, now president of Swarthmore College, will divide his time between New York and Swarthmore until the end of this academic year, when he will assume full leadership of the FPA.

Dr. Nason takes over the presidency from Brooks Emeny, who resigned in September and will become president emeritus. The new president has more than 20 years of educational experience at Swarthmore and has for three years been president of the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, one of the most active of the local affiliates of FPA. A member of Phi Beta Kappa and a Rhodes Scholar, he is a trustee of Phillips Exeter Academy and of the Edward W. Hazen Foundation. He is also a director of the National Conference of Christians and Jews in Philadelphia and has served as president of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education and as a member of the editorial board of *The American Scholar*.

The election of Dr. Nason coincides with a broad expansion of the activities of the 34-year-old FPA now being undertaken with substantial grants from the Fund for Adult Education, an independent organization established by the Ford Foundation. Mounting demand from the public for sound background information on current world problems, such as Korea, the Middle East and South Africa, will be met by the FPA through extension of its present services to communities throughout the

country. World Affairs Councils will be created and forums and local discussion groups assisted wherever a solidly backed local demand arises. These will follow the pattern created by the 30 existing FPA branches and local World Affairs Councils.

Expanded Community Program

As one result of an intensive survey made last spring and summer, the Board of Directors of the FPA recently adopted a thoroughgoing plan of reorganization designed to enable the association to serve autonomous local groups more effectively. By the terms of this plan, the national office in New York will become a service center for World Affairs Councils, forums, and so on throughout the nation. The Board is to be reorganized to provide for representation of all parts of the country on a systematic, continuing basis.

The new president will assume active general charge of the expanded program of national community organization, working through four newly created regional offices, whose directors will assist in organizing new world affairs study groups and act as liaison among them and between them and the national office.

A Standing Committee on National Program has been created and is actively at work to implement the new policies. This committee is a permanent advisory and operating arm of the Board of Directors and is composed principally of professional directors of World Affairs Councils. To complete the integration of the national office with local interests, four directors of World Affairs Councils have been elected to the national

Board of Directors of the FPA.

In announcing the new program, Mr. Seligman, a partner in the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, pointed out that the service facilities of FPA are greatly enlarged by the assistance it has received from the Fund for Adult Education. In making the recent grants to FPA, the Fund declared that its objective was to assist in fostering and coordinating the educational programs of World Affairs Councils in communities, large and small, throughout the nation. Mr. Seligman said he had been assured of the confidence of officers of the Fund in the expanded "grass roots" program of FPA.

"The reorganization plans of FPA persuaded them of the potentialities of FPA for stimulating and advancing a nation-wide program of community education in world affairs, a program to be built spontaneously in the community itself," he said.

The grants to FPA represent one part of the over-all pattern of assistance to adult education being provided by the Fund, which has set as its objective "the expansion of opportunities for all adult men and women to continue their education throughout life in the interests of mature and responsible citizenship."

"Given the contemporary fact of world-wide interdependence," the Fund said in its first Annual Report, "any educational program looking to mature and responsible citizenship must recognize that the citizens of the United States face the danger of war and loss of freedom. If these perils are to be averted, the American people must act with knowledge, courage and wisdom in a host of

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Consolidation of Policies in Asia

Since election-campaign criticism of American foreign policy centered on the policy in the Far East, it is understandable that President-elect Eisenhower, during his deliberate examination of the problems and opportunities, he is about to inherit, has stressed his interest in that area. The cautious statements he has made on Asia following his trip to Korea give the impression that whatever changes his Administration introduces in the Far East will come slowly. This is a period of study rather than decision.

Cautious Approach

No President or President-elect of the United States visited Asia until General Eisenhower arrived in Korea on December 2. By breaking the tradition of 163 years, he focused American attention on the East, but hardly in a manner to satisfy critics who have objected that the United States should make Asia instead of Europe the center of its foreign policy. First, General Eisenhower stayed in Korea but three days, and he spent only a brief part of that time with Dr. Syngman Rhee, the president of Korea. Second, upon his departure from Korea he announced that he opposed extension of the Korean war to Communist China, adducing much the same reasons that the Truman Administration has given for its opposition to a strategy that would risk enlargement of the war area. Third, he refrained from visiting Formosa, headquarters of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whose defeat by Chinese Communists in 1949 precipitated the present phase of the controversy as to whether the United States should pay chief attention to Europe or to Asia. Fourth, General

Eisenhower used the homeward trip from Asia aboard the U.S.S. *Helena* for discussion of many domestic as well as Asian and other foreign issues with leading members-designate of his new Cabinet, including John Foster Dulles, the incoming Secretary of State.

Changes in Prospect

It seems likely, however, that changes in Far Eastern policy will come in time. As long as policy remains what it is today, those who criticized the Truman Administration for the stalemate in Korea will have similar grounds for criticizing the Eisenhower Administration. Demands that Washington by some magic formula weaken the Communist hold on China and the familiar question whether to permit the Chinese troops on Formosa to get into action, either in Korea or in raids on the China coast, are sure to be pressed on General Eisenhower once he takes office. One reason why those issues make such a deep impression on many Americans is that Asia, far more than Europe, dramatizes the conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. A new version of this drama was recently enacted at the New York session of the United Nations Seventh General Assembly. The Assembly on December 3 adopted, 54 to 5, the Indian resolution for establishing a commission to repatriate prisoners of war in Korea. The United States, after some hesitation, voted for the resolution; the Soviet Union voted against it, and six days later Soviet UN delegate Andrei Vishinsky left New York announcing that the UN was a failure in advancing the cause of peace. On

December 15 the Chinese Communists in Peiping rejected the Indian proposal.

On his return from Korea on December 14, President-elect Eisenhower listed three possible approaches to the Korean war: (1) expansion and acceleration of the training of South Korean forces; (2) correction of "certain problems of supply"; and (3) consideration of the Korean war as "but the most dramatic and most painful phase, for us at this moment, of our world-wide struggle against Communist aggression."

The importance of Korea tends to obscure other problems in the Far East which demand Washington's attention but seldom arouse the public. One problem is to help Japan escape serious economic difficulties by improving its foreign trade opportunities. Another problem is to forge a bond of confidence between the United States and most of the newly independent nations of eastern and southern Asia—the Indonesian Republic, Burma, India and Pakistan. A critical question of policy is posed by the civil war in Indochina, where the Communist attack continues unabated after six years.

Before any one of these problems is tackled, however, the new Administration may be expected to work out a kind of consolidation of present policies. Along the coast of Asia, for example, the United States deals with issues raised by Korea, Japan, Formosa and Indochina through a series of policies hitherto only vaguely related. In Western Europe the United States has found strength in unity of policy. Now similar arguments are made for unity of policy in Asia.

BLAIR BOLLES



The Political Outlook in Japan

by Royden Dangerfield

Dr. Dangerfield, professor of political science and director of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois, spent the summers of 1951 and 1952 as visiting professor in the American Seminars in American Studies held at Tokyo and Kyoto universities.

The year 1952 has been one of momentous events and difficult decisions for the Japanese. This is the year of the peace treaty, of the end of military occupation, and of Japan's return to the status of sovereign independence. It is the year of alliances and alignments with the West. It is the year of the first parliamentary election of postwar, independent Japan. All of these developments have brought problems for the Japanese.

Opposition to Treaties

On April 28 the Treaty of Peace, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and the United States-Japanese Security Treaty, signed at the Presidio on the same date, came into force, as did the Administrative Agreement, which implemented the security pact, signed in Tokyo on February 28, 1952. These three instruments have important meanings for the Japanese. The coming into force of the Treaty of Peace marked the beginning of full responsibility of the Japanese government for all aspects of policy. The Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement meant that independent Japan would serve as a military, naval and air base for the United States in much the same manner as had occupied Japan.

The three agreements were not concluded without pain for the Japanese. The opposition to the treaties included the Communist party, the Labor-Farmer party and the left wing of the Socialist party, as well as labor, farmer and student organizations allied with those parties. Also opposed were a number of well-known aca-

demic and intellectual leaders. While the opposition was not strong enough to prevent ratification of the two treaties or to prevent the government from concluding the Administrative Agreement, it has not been silenced. The same group have continued since to demand revision of the peace treaty and the abrogation of the security pact; but their most bitter criticism has been leveled at the Administrative Agreement. The grant of blanket extraterritoriality to United States military personnel, to civilian components, and to the families of both groups is denounced as "shameful, dishonorable, tantamount to reducing the country to a colonial status." The government is charged with practicing "secret diplomacy" and with making Japan a puppet of the United States.

Japanese relations with China have remained a very troublesome problem. The China market and the raw materials of that country are not only desirable but are deemed essential to the future economic well-being of Japan. There are many and diverse groups pushing the government to permit trade between Communist China and Japan. The Korean conflict, however, has caused the United Nations to insist that Japan ban such trade. The pro-American policy of the Yoshida government has included the placing of effective restrictions upon China trade.

There was also the problem of making peace with China. As a part of the peace settlement, the Japanese and Chinese National governments began negotiations on February 20,

1952. The treaty signed on April 28, only a few hours before the general peace treaty came into force, was something of a compromise. The exchange of notes concerning the treaty made it clear that the terms were restricted to "territories which are now, or which may thereafter be, under the control" of the Chinese Nationalists. The notes indicated that the treaty did not imply recognition by Japan of unlimited Chinese Nationalist sovereignty over all of Chinese territory. Nor did the treaty preclude the future possibility of Japan's dealing with the Chinese Communist government.

Election Issues

The question of Chinese relations, particularly those of trade, continued to be important in political discussions and had its place among campaign issues in the fall election of October 1, 1952; Japan's first parliamentary election in the postoccupation period. This was a most important election, since it constituted the first test of opinion, after the termination of Allied control and influence, on the vital issues of the peace treaty, the United States-Japanese Security Treaty, and the controversial Administrative Agreement. It was a test of popular reaction to the pro-American, pro-Western foreign policy and of the domestic program of the Yoshida government.

One of the principal issues in the election was the question of rearmament. This, of course, tended to include the whole field of foreign policy. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida

has consistently taken a conservative position with regard to armaments. He supported the principles of Article IX of the postwar constitution, which forbids the Japanese government to maintain any form of armed establishment. On the other hand, he went along with General Douglas MacArthur's request that the Japanese establish a Police Reserve to replace the American troops withdrawn from Japan in 1950 to serve in Korea. In 1952 the Yoshida government increased the size of the Police Reserve from 75,000 to 110,000 and changed its name to the Safety Force. The prime minister has consistently maintained that this establishment is not an army and that its creation was not a violation of the constitution. He has actively opposed those who would create an army because he has felt the Japanese economy could not support rearmament. He once remarked that the building of a single torpedo boat would torpedo Japanese finance. He did concede late in the campaign that perhaps the Japanese might be able to finance a beginning of rearmament in about four years.

The faction of the Liberal party led by Ichiro Hatoyama severely criticized Yoshida's stand on armaments. He was chided for his denial that the Police Reserve was not an armed force and that rearmament was not already under way. Hatoyama wanted to repeal Article IX so as to permit the establishment of a real army. For two quite different reasons he wanted to see the Japanese rearm. First, he feared the menace of Soviet aggression and of an internal Communist threat. He felt these could be met only if Japan were armed. Second, he wanted rearmament as a means of demonstrating Japan's independence. Hatoyama also criticized the prime minister for the subservient position of Japan with re-

spect to the United States. He felt that as long as Japan was dependent upon the United States for its security it would remain subservient. Thus foreign policy and armaments were tied together.

The Progressive party took much the same position as the Hatoyama faction with respect to rearmament. The Right-wing Socialists opposed amendment to the constitution but seemed to indicate that they accepted some form of rearmament as inevitable. They demanded termination of the Administrative Agreement and an end to American military bases in Japan. The Left-wing Socialists were firmly opposed to rearmament. They urged a policy of neutrality as between East and West, and looked to India for leadership.

Liberal Party Split

The question of trade with Red China was an issue in the campaign. Often it was not voiced, but it was nevertheless real. The China market and the raw materials of the Chinese territories are viewed with longing eyes by both the public and the industrial leaders. It is felt that a part of the solution to the Japanese economic problem lies in the promotion of trade with Communist China. Both Liberals and Progressives talked "with two voices" with respect to the China trade. Some leaders urged caution; others were outspoken in favor of Asian trade. The prime minister had gone along with the United States and had placed such restrictions on this trade as to limit it to the merest of trickles. Mikio Mizuta, chairman of the Political Affairs Research Council of the Liberal party, stated "unconditional devotion to the United States in this regard will not do." The chairman of the Financial Policy Committee of the Progressive party said: "We must consider wise cooperation with the United States,

but the Yoshida policy of going along with United States Far Eastern policy is no good. Severing relations with the Chinese continent is something which no one who considers economic independence [for Japan] earnestly should be able to consider." The Socialists tended to favor unlimited trade with the Chinese Reds, but in the Right-wing faction there were some who advised caution. The Communists demanded freedom of trade with all countries on the basis of reciprocity.

In the realm of financial policy there was a sharp division between the two Liberal party factions. The Hatoyama faction, with Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi—former finance minister—as its spokesman, demanded a positive policy which would assist capital expansion. He proposed the issuance of public bonds through the Bank of Japan, the proceeds of which would be used for expansion. The Yoshida faction, led by Hayato Ikeda, minister of finance in the Yoshida cabinet prior to the dissolution of Parliament, favored tax rebates for corporations and individuals provided they would invest such rebates in bonds, the proceeds of which would go for the financing of basic industries. Each of the policies found supporters in the business world, but both were opposed by the left-wing parties.

Election Results

The number of eligible voters was announced by the National Election Management as 45,285,000. In the October 1 election a total of 36,294,934 voted—a participation of 82.4 percent.

The Liberal party candidates polled 48 percent of the total vote—a total of nearly 17 million votes. This was an increase of 3.5 million votes over the total polled in 1949, when the party received 43.9 percent. Even

with the increased proportion of the total vote received, the party won only 238 seats (Hatoyama claimed the figure was 241). In 1949 the party elected 264 members of the House; in the 13th Diet it controlled 288 seats.

The Progressive party candidates polled nearly 6.5 million votes (as compared with 5,840,000 in 1949), or 18.2 percent (19.1 percent in 1949). The party won 85 seats in the new House (67 in the old House).

The Right-wing Socialists polled almost 4 million votes, 11.4 percent of the total, and elected 57 members of the House. The Left-wing Socialists received 3,460,000 votes, 9.9 percent, and elected 54 members. The total Socialist vote in 1952 was 7,431,589 (21.3 percent) as compared with 4,129,794 in 1949 (13.5 percent). The two factions won 111 seats in the new House as compared with 46 in the old House.

The Communist party candidates polled less than 900,000 votes (2.5 percent). In 1949 the party candidates received 2,984,780 (9.7 percent). The party failed to elect a single member of the House in 1952, whereas in 1949 it elected 35 and in the 13th Diet it had 22 members of the House.

The "splinter" parties polled 1,200,000 votes (3.5 percent) and elected 11 members of the House. In 1949 the parties polled 2,200,000 (7.3 percent) and they held 13 seats in the last Diet.

Independent candidates polled 2,360,000 votes (6.5 percent) in 1952 as compared with 2,000,000 in 1949. The number of Independents in the House of Representatives is now 19 as compared with 4 in the last Diet.

The election was a victory for those who stood for close cooperation with the West and for a pro-United States foreign policy. This conclusion, however, is subject to reservations. It is

very doubtful that the future policy will be as pro-West as that of the past four years. The election was also a victory for the "right" in that the Communists received a crushing defeat. It should be noted, however, that the Socialist Right and Left factions showed a marked increase in strength. The two groups increased their combined membership in the House of Representatives by 65. If the Socialists are classified as "left," the election was not such an overwhelming victory for the "right" as is at first apparent. The Liberal party lost 44 seats, and the Progressives gained 18 seats. These two parties of the "right" showed a combined net loss of 26 seats.

Communist Defeat

There were several reasons for the crushing defeat of the Communists. The restrictive acts of the Occupation and of the government had deprived the party of much of its top leadership. The party had gone underground to a major degree. The violent demonstrations and the damage done by riots were blamed upon the party and alienated much popular support. The party received the blame for the Soviet Union's refusal to repatriate the thousands of Japanese taken prisoner by the Soviet forces in Manchuria at the time of the surrender. The party suffered also because the Soviet Union vetoed Japan's admission to the United Nations Organization on the eve of the election. All of these were factors of importance in causing the Communist defeat.

The Liberal party won an absolute majority of seats in the House of Representatives, but the margin was not large. More important is the fact that the Liberal party is still divided into two factions. The battle between Yoshida and Hatoyama is a "pure struggle for power," but it also represents a basic division of opinion. The

parliamentary situation will remain difficult because of this split.

The troubles of the Liberals became evident in the choosing of the prime minister. There were several days of conferences preceding the calling of the Diet into session. Even after the Diet convened, a full day of conferences was required before Mr. Hatoyama was willing to rise in the House and nominate Mr. Yoshida for the prime minister's post. Approval by the House followed as a matter of course.

In selecting his cabinet Mr. Yoshida retained seven members of his old cabinet and added nine new men. All but four of the sixteen members belong to the Yoshida faction of the Liberal party. Eight of the sixteen men had been purged from public life by the Occupation and had only recently been depurged by the government. This is clear evidence of the right-wing character of the cabinet.

From the beginning of the new government observers have realized that "the bitterness between Yoshida and Hatoyama runs so deep that . . . [there is nothing] but a shaky future for the new Yoshida cabinet." It is clear that Hatoyama can upset the government at any time he decides to see a new government come into power. This was made very clear on November 28 when the government faced a crisis.

Mr. Ikeda, minister of international trade and industry, told the Diet on November 27 that as Japan moves from an inflationary to a stabilized economy "some small and medium enterprises may be bankrupt and they may have to commit suicide, but this cannot be helped." The opposition parties demanded that Ikeda take back his words, but he refused to do so. A resolution of "no confidence" directed against Mr. Ikeda was passed by a vote of 208 to 201. Some 30 of Hatoyama's followers left the cham-

ber, thus making it possible for the measure to pass.

The incident did not result in the resignation of Mr. Ikeda, nor was the resolution one of no confidence in the government; but it was clearly a demonstration that the government's majority was not such as to guarantee either stability or permanence.

The great problems of 1952 remain unsolved. The basic decision with respect to rearmament and the amendment of the constitution remains to be made. There still remains the threat of inflation. There still exists the problem of how to provide capital for the necessary expansion of industrial capacity. There are still the great unsolved problems of markets and sources of raw materials. There is still the very vexatious problem of trade with the Communist areas of Asia. As the government moves to solve any or all of these problems it will face bitter opposition within the Liberal party as well as opposition from other parties. The political future of Japan, it seems safe to predict, is not apt to be stable. Most observers feel that the Yoshida government will not last through 1953 and that it may fall within the first half of the year.

SUGGESTED READING: Robert A. Scalapino, "Japan and the General Elections," *Far Eastern Survey*, October 29, 1952; Hugh H. Smythe, "Nationalism in

Japan," *The Fortnightly*, September 1952; "Japan Eyes the China Market," *The Economist*, September 6, 1952; Nuisaburo Inoue, "Balance Sheet of Six Years Under Occupation," *New Japan*, 1952 (Osaka, Mainichi Press, 1952); Russell Tiltman, "Political Parties in Japan," *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, September 4, 1952; Evelyn S. Colbert, *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952); Rodger Swearingen and Paul F. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952).

New President

(Continued from page 3)

complex situations." The grants to the FPA are designed to assist citizens to act wisely in world affairs through free and unbiased study of world problems.

Commenting on his election Dr. Nason said: "I am very much pleased by the opportunity to become the president of the Foreign Policy Association. There is no more important work to be done today than to present the facts and point up the issues relating to world events and thereby to provide the American people with a means of making their decisions about American foreign policy. I am gratified by the confidence and support shown by the Fund for Adult Education. The Fund is providing the association with the means by which the FPA can perform a major public service and become a vital force in education on foreign affairs in every major community in the country."

FPA Bookshelf

GREAT BRITAIN

Winston Churchill, An Informal Study of Greatness, by Robert Lewis Taylor. New York, Doubleday, 1952. \$4.50.

This is undoubtedly one of the most colorful and interesting biographies of our times. To quote the author, Churchill is "the last of the great statesmen . . . possibly the liveliest personality yet produced by the upper vertebrates." Mr. Taylor goes ahead to prove his statement with a wealth of facts and anecdotes calculated to entertain even the most serious student of politics.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The Arab Refugee Problem, by Joseph B. Schechtman. New York, Philosophical Library, 1952. \$3.

This small, compact and well-documented book by an authority on demographic problems will be of interest to all students of the Arab refugee problem. In his study of the problem's origin to its present status Dr. Schechtman develops the theory of resettlement in Arab countries as the only feasible solution to this difficult situation.

Unambo: A Novel of the War in Israel, by Max Brod. New York, Farrar, Straus & Young, 1952. \$3.

The conflicts which confronted the people of the new state of Israel during and after the War of Liberation are vividly dramatized by Max Brod. His concern is for the people who emerged—the heroes, the self-seeking black-marketeers, the intellectuals—who are all combining to create a new land of hope—"for Israel and all men."

My Turkish Adventure, by Pamela Burr. New York, Norton, 1951. \$3.

An American teacher of English at the American Girls' College in Istanbul since 1945 gives an interesting if not profound account of modern Turkey.

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